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UNITED STATES V. ODONI, 782 F.3D 
1226 (11TH CIR. 2015). 
THE INTERNATIONAL LOOPHOLE TO 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
Stephanie C. Wharen* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This case comment discusses and evaluates the Eleventh 
United States v. Odoni,1 which appealed 
criminal convictions of co-defendants Simon Odoni and Paul 
Gunter for their involvement in an international investment 
fraud scheme.2 While the defendants raised many issues on 
appeal,3 I will focus on the most novel issue addressed by the 
an agent of a foreign government constitutes a search under the 
Fourth Amendment and, therefore, requires a warrant in order 
to be lawful. 4 This case comment particularly addresses the 
following: (1) whether a citizen traveling abroad has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in personal belongings; and 
(2) whether an agent of a foreign government, particularly an 
agent associated with foreign law 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor 2016, University of South 
Carolina School of Law. 
1 See United States of America v. Odoni, 782 F.3d 1226 
(11th Cir. 2015). 
2 See id. at 1229-31. 
3 The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in 
arguments included the following: (1) that the district court lacked 
personal jurisdiction; (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict; 
(3) the court erred in denying the motion for a new trial; and (4) the 
sentence was unreasonable. The Court of Appeals reviewed all of 
denying his motion to suppress electronic evidence due to an unlawful 
See 
Odoni, 782 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2015). 
4 See id. at 1237-40. 
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-  article 
takes the position that the Odoni decision expands the well-
established, so- -
a Fourth Amendment search has not occurred where the items 
examined have been previously and knowingly exposed to third 
parties.5 
 
I. HISTORY 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.6 
One of the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment is to 
guard against arbitrary government intrusions and to provide 
citizens with a sense of privacy in their own matters. This goal 
is achieved by requiring that a search warrant be obtained prior 
to executing a search in order for the search to be lawful. The 
courts have established the exclusionary rule to protect against 
7 Generally, the exclusionary rule prohibits the use of 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment from 
being used against a defendant whose Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated.8 
Private intrusions not conducted under the authority of 
the government are exempted from the Fourth  
 
 
5 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988); 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
7 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 
392 (1920). 
8 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
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requirements.9 Where a private party has first searched  or been 
exposed to the information, there is no longer a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and therefore, examination of anything 
knowingly exposed or first searched by a third party is not a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.10 
The advent of technology has required courts to address 
searches in the realm of electronic sources of evidence. In 
United States v. Segura-Baltazar, the Eleventh Circuit held that 
to prove an electronic search is unconstitutional, an individual 
needs to show that there was a reasonable expectation of 
privacy when the United States law enforcement entity viewed 
the evidence. 11 The Supreme Court has previously held that the 
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures did not apply where United States agents searched 
and seized property located in a foreign country owned by a 
nonresident alien in the United States.12 The Odoni decision 
extends that holding to apply to citizens of the United States.13 
 
II. FACTS 
Co-defendants Simon Andrew Odoni and Paul Robert 
Gunter were convicted and sentenced in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Florida.14 Simon Odoni 
was sentenced to 160 months in prison for one count of 
conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, one count of 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to 
commit money laundering, one count of engaging in illegal 
monetary transactions, ten counts of mail fraud, and nine counts 
of wire fraud.15  
 
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
10 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 119 20 
(1984); Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1238 (11th Cir. 2015). 
11 United States v. Segura-Baltazar,  448  F.3d  1281,  1286 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th 
Cir. 1995)). 
12 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270  
75 (1990). 
13 See Odoni, 782 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2015). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 1230 31. 
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his roles in two schemes.16 The first was a fraudulent stock 
scheme where he held two roles that lead to his convictions.17 
fabricated scripts in order to sell stock in shell companies.18 
Odoni also was the CEO of one of these shell companies, 
Nanoforce, which did no actual business, although he issued 
press releases with false statements to incentivize victims to 
buy stocks.19 
The second scheme was a forex-fraud scheme involving 
the sale of foreign-exchange options. 20 Odoni provided escrow 
services to Hartford Management Group by creating the 
International Escrow Enterprises, which set up accounts to 
receive investor funds; he received a five-percent escrow fee 
from the company that was participating in foreign- exchange 
options without informing investors of risks or placing trade 
21 Simon Odoni appealed his 
personal jurisdiction over him; (2) there was insufficient 
evidence to convict him; (3) the district court erred in denying 
his motion for a new trial; and (4) his 160- month sentence is 
22 
For his role in the two investment-fraud schemes, Paul 
Gunter was sentenced to 300 months in prison for one count of 
conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, one count of 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to 
commit money laundering, thirteen counts of engaging in 
illegal monetary transactions, ten counts of mail fraud, and nine 
counts of wire fraud. 23 Gunter provided escrow services and 
managed bank accounts for both the fraudulent-stock and forex-
fraud schemes. 24 The Norfolk Constabulary seized 
 
16 Id. at 1229. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 1229 30. 
19 See Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1230 (11th Cir. 2015). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 1229. 
23 Id. at 1237. 
24 Id. at 1234.
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electronic evidence in the UK after looking into the fraudulent 
stock scheme.25 Due to a lack of sufficient resources, the 
(SFO) to step in.26 During its investigation, the SFO seized 
several scripts for boiler rooms, notebooks, volumes of shares, 
computers, and boxes of documents. The SFO documented and 
placed all seized items in an office where only investigators had 
access.27 bile phones, a 
laptop computer, a thumb drive, some photo CDs, and a camera 
were seized. 28 A forensic investigator from the SFO reviewed 
these items in September 2007.29  British authorities provided 
the electronic evidence to 
U.S. officials in late 2007, whereupon federal agents reviewed 
the evidence without a search warrant.30 On appeal, Gunter 
suppress electronic evidence (and the fruits thereof),  
U.S. authorities searched without obtaining a warrant.31 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. REPORT 
The Unites States Court of Appeals affirmed the United 
acked personal jurisdiction 
due to the methods used to bring him to the United States from 
the Dominican Republic for prosecution, the appellate court 
determined it did not violate the extradition treaty between the 
two countries. 32 United States v. Arbane reiterated the Ker-
Frisbie 
defeat personal jurisdiction by 
 
 
 
25 See Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1236 (11th Cir. 2015). 
26 See id. at 1234. 
27 Id. at 1235. 
28 Id. at 1236. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 Id. at 1234. 
32 See id. at 1232. 
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asserting the illegality of the procurement of his presence in 
33 
First, Odoni claimed that his extradition fell within the one 
exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. 34 
one exceptio
explicit provision making the treaty the exclusive means by 
35 To prevail 
reference to the express language of a treaty and/or the 
established practice thereunder, that the United States 
specifically agreed to not seize [the defendant] from the 
36 Yet, the court determined that 
xtradition 
treaty, by its express terms, required the United States only to 
obtain him through a formal extradition request; rather, the 
court determined that when conditions of the treaty are met and 
one government requests extradition, the other will uphold the 
extradition.37 
argument that the evidence used to convict him was 
insufficient failed because the evidence was not just 
sufficient, but overwhelming. 38 Appellate courts review 
evidence sufficienc
government and draw all reasonable inferences and make all 
 
 
 
33 United States v. Arbane, 446 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir.  2006) 
(citing United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1214 (11th Cir.1997)). 
34 Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1231. 
35 Id. at 1231 (citing Arbane, 446 F.3d at  1225);  See also United 
States v. Alzarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 662 (1992) (noting that there 
Ker only when . . . the  terms of the 
treaty provide that its bre  
36 Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1232 (quoting United States v. Noriega, 117 
F.3d 1206, 1213 (11th Cir.1997)). 
37  Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1231-32; see also Convention Between  the 
United States and the Dominican Republic for the Extradition of 
Criminals, Dom. Rep.-U.S., art. I, June 19, 1909, 36 Stat. 2468. 
38 Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1232. 
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39 
Here, the court considered witness testimony from two 
individuals who claimed Odoni discussed the fraud scheme 
with them in depth. 40 Additionally, the court considered 
involvement with fraudulent companies.41 Thus, considering 
the totality of the record, the court found that the evidence was 
more than sufficient to sustain the convictions.42 
that the court erred by not 
granting a mistrial the appellate court held that any such error 
was harmless.43 Odoni argued that the district court violated 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43; the Rule states that the 
defendant should be at every trial stage.44 However, the court 
(addressing a potentially missing exhibit that was never entered 
during trial) did not rise to the level of being absent from a trial 
stage.45 
Lastly, Odoni argued that his 160-month sentence was 
unreasonable. The appellate court ruled that his sentence was 
substantively reasonable.46 The factors Odoni argued that 
showed  his  sentence  was  unreasonable  are  codified  in  18 
U.S.C. §3553(a) and include his personal history, and the 
characteristics of the offense; Odoni also argued some factors 
outside the statute: his diminished role in the offense, and the 
proportionality of his sentence compared to those of more 
culpable co-defendants.47 The court used the review standard 
set out in United States v. Irey
district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing 
the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that 
 
 
39 E.g., United States v. Thomas, 987 F.2d 697, 701 (11th  
Cir. 1993). 
40 Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1232. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 1232-33. 
43 Id. at 1233. 
44 Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a). 
45 Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1233. 
46 Id. 
47 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012); Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1233 34. 
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lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the 
48 
sentence was warranted and not an abuse of discretion.49 
The Unites States Court of Appeals affirmed the United 
on both issues Paul Gunter appealed but stated only one issue
the denial of a motion to suppress electronic evidence
warranted discussion.50 The Court of Appeals held the District 
evidence.51 In reviewing this issue, the appellate court had to 
address the search and seizure of the electronic evidence. 52 
Gunter was not appealing the seizure of the evidence by the 
foreign entity because of the  exclusionary rule in the Fourth 
Amendment. This is due to the fact that in United States v. 
Morrow the court repeated the standard that the excl.ionary rule 
cannot apply to seizures that occurred on foreign soil.53 To 
States agents was unconstitutional, he had to prove an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. 54 However, the 
precedent repeated in United States v. Jacobsen states that if a 
private party, or foreign government agent, has searched the 
content prior to the U.S. government agent, the individual no 
longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy.55 Since the 
British officials searched the electronic data before sending 
them to United States agents, Gunter no longer had a reasonable 
of the electronic evidence in the United States was not a 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.56 
 
 
48 Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1233 (quoting United States v. Irey,  
612 F.3d 1160, 1188 89 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)). 
49 Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1233. 
50 Id. at 1234. 
51 Id. at 1240. 
52 Id. at 1237. 
53 United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th Cir.  
1976) (citing Birdswell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 (5th Cir. 
1965)). 
54 Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1238. 
55 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119 20. 
56 Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1289. 
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B. ANALYSIS 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.57 
duty rests upon 
this court than to exert its full authority to prevent all 
58 A 
right to privacy and protection from an unreasonable search is 
the essential principle of the Fourth Amendment. 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has used the so-called 
-
under the Fourth Amendment, and whether it leaves 
information collected from third parties with no protection.59 
There is difficulty in creating a meeting place, which governs 
how and when information should be accessible to police via a 
third party.60 The difference between the generic third-party 
doctrine and the situation in the Odoni case is that the third 
party at play is a foreign investigative police force.61 How far 
can this extend? Indeed, how far should it extend? 
 
 
57 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
58 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 382 (1901) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
59 See Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth 
Amendment: Protecting Third Party Information, Third Parties, and 
The Rest of us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 976 (2007) (The author 
points out that the "third-party doctrine" affords no Fourth Amendment 
protection to information in the hands of a third party). 
60 See, id. - party 
 usage). 
61 See Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1234 (This is an international 
investigation being conducted with the aid of the International 
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In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court of the United 
are involved, there can be no rulemaking or legislation which 
62 In my opinion, the Odoni decision 
creates a loophole that allows the U.S. government to overreach 
and abrogates a federal right granted by the Constitution. 
Searches that would be unlawful if conducted inside the United 
States can now be lawful simply because a foreign entity, with 
drastically different laws regarding search and seizures, looked 
at the material first. This alone does not merit the expulsion of 
United States has set a standard that a search warrant requires 
probable cause, an oath or affirmation, a particular description, 
and due process.63 Exceptions to this standard should be rare 
and include exigent circumstances, search incident to arrest, 
cars and containers, the plain-view doctrine, and consent.64 
Although it may be plausible that agents from a foreign legal 
authority may act as individuals to provide an affirmation or 
particular description, the simple fact alone that they have 
viewed the electronic data should not be sufficient to violate an 
warrant requirement is an essential element in our justice 
system that should not be tossed aside lightly. The 
reasonableness of the search should also be addressed. 
 
Criminal Police O
well as British, Spanish, and Icelandic Police forces). 
62 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966). 
63 See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551,  557  (2004)  (holding 
particularity is required in a search warrant as provided in Fourth 
Amendment); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933) 
(explaining a judicial official cannot issue a valid warrant without 
finding probable cause given the facts presented to him  under oath or 
affirmation); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (clarifying the 
right to privacy is enforceable against the states through the Due 
Process Clause, and the Due Process Clause protects other rights such 
 
offic  
64 See Jeanette D. Brooks, Valid  Searches  and  Seizures  Without 
Warrants, INST. OF GOV T 1 4, 6 7 (2004), 
http://www.ncids.org/Defender%20Training/2004%20Fall%20Confe 
rence/Exceptions.pdf. 
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To determine if a search is unreasonable, a balancing test 
between the government interest and privacy interest must be 
weighed. Clearly, if there is a present emergency the justice 
system allows for a lower standard for Fourth Amendment 
privacy rights of an individual. The exigent circumstances 
exception takes account for this specific instance. 65 However, 
in situations where foreign police collect the evidence, there are 
no exigent circumstances present absent immediate threats of 
attack. The warrant requirement exemptions mentioned above 
exist for a reason: to keep law enforcement and the community 
safe.66 I believe the foreign loophole established in Odoni is 
more of a loophole for matters of convenience rather than 
necessity. In Odoni, the government failed to obtain a search 
warrant because it was more convenient not to, not because 
they were unable to obtain one. 67 Convenience should not be 
Constitutional rights. In my opinion, foreign obtained evidence 
intended to be used in a criminal proceeding in the United States 
against a citizen of the United States should be held to the same 
standard as domestic evidence; therefore, a search warrant 
should be executed to retrieve it  
government  more quickly than its own failure to observe its 
own laws, or worse, its disregard of the character of its own 
68 
practices get their first footing . . . by silent approaches and 
foreign entity loophole is an appropriate depiction of this 
standard.69 
 
65 See generally id. at 1 2 (outlining the various exceptions 
available to government agents to being required to obtain a warrant, 
under so- . 
66 Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 231 (1973) 
(suggesting that officer safety and public safety were both important 
 
67  Cf. Odoni, 782 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2015) (suggesting that  the 
government did not obtain a warrant out of a sense of  convenience and 
not for reasons of exigency). 
68 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 232 (1971) (quoting 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643, 659 (1961)). 
69 Wayne R. LaFave, Essay, The Forgotten Motto of Obsta 
Principiis in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 Ariz. L. Rev. 291, 
294 (1989) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)). 
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To some, this may seem like a meaningless or unnecessary step, 
but it is the basis of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
granted to every citizen of the United States. 70 The Government 
interest does not outweigh the privacy interest of an individual 
simply because the information sought after is obtained in a 
foreign country.71 
 
C. PRACTICAL IMPACT 
1. DECREASING INDIVIDUALS OURTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTIONS 
A significant practical impact of United States v. Odoni is 
f the private-search doctrine and 
72 
under Odoni to encompass foreign law enforcement authorities. 
73 This provides the U.S. government with a loophole around 
States Constitution.74  If any foreign law enforcement authority 
conducts a search of a particular piece of evidence, then a 
United States law enforcement authority would have the right 
to search that piece of evidence as well, regardless of the 
legality of the originally conducted search.75 Treating a foreign 
law authority the same as a 
 
 
70 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 61 (1967) 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution). 
71 But cf., Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1237 (suggesting that 
government interests are outweighed by private privacy interests when 
evidence is obtained in a foreign country). 
72 Cf. Day Pitney LLP, United States: White Collar Roundup, 
MONDAQ (Feb. 4, 2015), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/371552/Corporate+Crime/W 
hite+Collar+Roundup+February+2015 (last visited Dec. 9, 2015) 
Odoni decision). 
73 Id. 
74 See Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1238 39; Day Pitney LLP, supra 
note 72. 
75 Cf. Day Pitney LLP, supra note 72. 
80  
 
private party is drastically unfair. In the United States, the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to a private action, such as 
a neighbor finding something and turning it over to police. 
However, the Fourth Amendment does apply if the person is a 
law enforcement agent. In order to safeguard citizens
rights, this standard should apply similarly in a foreign capacity 
as well. If a foreign individual turns something over to foreign 
law enforcement, which is then provided to United States law 
enforcement, then that evidence should be deemed acceptable 
under the American standard, but not if the private party 
viewing the evidence is a foreign law entity. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The decision in Odoni expands the third-party exception to 
searches by considering foreign law enforcement officers to fall 
within its scope.76 
expectations of privacy by following different search warrant 
requirements than that of the Fourth Amendment while 
decreasing the protections afforded by the Amendment. 
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit in Odoni sets a new 
precedent by treating foreign law enforcement entities as 
private parties, eliminating the need for a search warrant if 
foreign law enforcement views evidence prior to turning it over 
to United States law enforcement. The question then becomes, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1237. 
